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I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most frequently cited quotation in property 
cases in general, and in those grappling with estates and ·future 
interests in particular, is Justice Holmes' admonition that 
[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than 
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still 
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from 
blind imitation of the past. 1 
The reasons behind the rules governing the compensation 
awarded an owner whose property has been taken have not van-
ished but are frequently forsaken. If the United States Supreme 
Court is taken at its word, the normative basis for providing just 
compensation in all takings cases should be the fifth amend-
ment's dictate of fairness and indemnity.2 Yet in answering the 
just compensation question, courts are plagued by the tendency 
to consciously sacrifice fairness and indemnity for objective 
standards in the name of procedural simplicity. 
Just compensation is the final question in a series of queries 
which compose the "jurisprudence of taking."3 The preceding 
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1. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 37 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (significant deviation from fifth amendment's indemnity principle is mani-
festly unjust); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 513 (1979) (question-
ing market value as adequate to satisfy fifth amendment's indemnity standard); United 
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1972) (constitutional just compensation derived from 
basic fairness principles); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 
(1950) (defining just compensation through concepts of fairness and equity). 
3. See Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Prop-
789 
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questions are first, whether there has been a taking of private 
property; second, whether there is any justification for the tak-
ing which eliminates the compensation requirement, such as the 
police power; and, third, whether the taking is for a public use. 4 
While the United States Supreme Court is still struggling to 
conceive a coherent doctrine for answering whether there has 
been a taking and whether it is compensable,5 it has virtually 
eliminated the public use requirement from the analysis. How-
ever, the Court has provided a definitive answer to the just com-
pensation question. ·In condemnation cases in general, the fair-
market-value standard has assumed the position of the pagan 
god of just compensation despite the protests of heretics pro-
moting economic efficiency and fairness. 6 The standard which 
has reigned supreme in compensating certain types of future in-
terest holders, has been the Restatement's "imminency" test, al-
though it has been displaced somewhat by a "difference-in-
value" test. 7 
Future interest cases, particularly those in which a possibil-
ity of reverter has been condemned, provide a microcosm for 
erty, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 26 (outlining questions of governmental power limits to emi-
nent domain). 
4. SeeR. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE PowER OF EMINENT DoMAIN 
31 (1985) (developing theory of eminent domain evaluation through four sequential 
questions). Whether or not one agrees with his answers, Professor Epstein's delineation 
of the questions provides a workable analytical tool. 
5. See First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 312-13 (1987) (accepting without review decision of California Supreme Court 
that requirement of grant of easement as condition to issuance of building permit consti-
tutes taking). See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) 
(declining to specify legitimate state interests in case where state action was clearly not 
valid). For a discussion of the implications of these and other cases on the threshold 
takings question, see Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in 
Takings, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1585 (1988). For a review of the theories that the 
United States Supreme Court has used in the past to provide answers to these questions, 
see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964). 
6. Compare United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 512 (fair market 
value adequate general rule for balancing public need with private loss) with R. PoSNER, 
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 51 (3d ed. 1986) (economic efficiency able to account for all 
necessary costs of compensation); Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An 
Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 569, 572, 582-99 (1984) (economic efficiency ap-
proach balancing benefits and costs of compensation); Durham, Efficient Just Compen-
sation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1277, 1278-79 (1985) (market 
value not adequate to prevent inefficient government action); Michelman, Property, 
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" 
Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1172 (1967) (fairness as single test for correct compensa-
tion); and Sax, supra note 5, at 57 (fairness constraining arbitrary governmental abuses). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 62-81. 
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viewing how overemphasizing objective standards compromises 
the effectiveness of just compensation as a deterrent to govern-
mental abuses of private property.8 The just compensation re-
quirement has been firmly cast in this deterrence role by the 
newly-neutered status of the public use requirement. Compensa-
tion will work as an effective deterrent, however, only when 
courts are freed from the shackles of predetermined standards 
and extend their grasps to the equities of each case. 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the general 
inappropriateness of strictly adhering to any one predetermined 
standard in compensating owners whose property has been 
taken. Holmes' admonition is appropriate in this instance not 
because the reasons behind the standards have vanished, but be-
cause the courts, "from blind imitation" of these objective stan-
dards, have strayed from their reason for being. That reason is 
the just compensation requirement in the fifth amendment. 9 
Section II of this article compares United States Supreme Court 
opinions with other approaches to determine when, in general, 
compensation is "just" compensation.10 The purpose of this sec-
tion is to urge that just compensation be equated with the fifth 
amendment's dictate of fairness and indemnity rather than with 
any one objective standard. Section III analyzes the rules the 
Restatement of Property and the courts have provided for de-
8. Regardless of its exact historical grounding, deterrence is definitely a function of 
just compensation. SeeR. PosNER, supra note 6, at 51. Posner states: 
A straight forward economic explanation for the requirement of just compensa-
tion is that it prevents the government from overusing the taking power. If 
there were no such requirement, the government would have an incentive to 
substitute land for other inputs that were socially cheaper but more costly to 
the government. 
Id. See also Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 44 (pur-
pose of takings clause to discipline government excesses). Professor Sax labeled the view 
of just compensation as a mandate that economic values be maintained against govern-
ment diminution as one of the abiding myths of American constitutional law. See gener-
ally Sax, supra note 5, at 54. But see Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 
47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 586 (1972) (criticizing Sax's conclusions on the purpose of just 
compensation). For an historical review of the just compensation requirement, see Note, 
The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985). 
9. U.S. CoNST. amend. V (requiring due process and just compensation for depriva-
tion of property). The fifth amendment states in part: "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." ld. This takings clause has been held 
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B & Q R.R. v. 
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-36 (1897) (takings procedure alone insufficient to sat-
isfy due process under fourteenth amendment without compensation). 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 13~52. 
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ciding how a future interest holder should be compensated. 11 
The rules governing compensation for an owner of a possibility 
of reverter are emphasized throughout, since they represent the 
most egregious departure from the constitutional dictate. This 
section presents the condemnation of fee simple determinables 
as representative of the objective standards' failure in determin-
ing just compensation in all takings cases and proposes restruc-
turing this approach by dethroning objective standards and em-
phasizing the equities of each case. Section IV reviews a recent 
article by Professors Goldberg and Merrill, and Daniel Unumb 
in which they support a "default rule" which gives the entire 
condemnation award to the grantee of a fee simple determinable 
thereby denying the owner of the possibility of reverter any 
compensation. 12 Section IV takes issue with their support of this 
rule and demonstrates that, despite their indications to the con-
trary, ex ante clauses could work effectively in a deed granting a 
fee simple determinable. 
II. THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF JusT CoMPENSATION IN 
DETERRING GovERNMENTAL ABusE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
The most recent Supreme Court case to have considerable 
impact on just compensation awards addresses the public use 
question. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff/ 3 the Court 
effectively eliminated the public use requirement from takings 
analysis by broadening the scope of governmental actions consti-
tuting a public use. The Court held that this requirement is "co-
terminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers" and 
emphasized judicial deference to legislative determinations. 14 Af-
ter Midkiff, it is unlikely that a governmental action will ever be 
struck down as violative of the public use requirement.15 There-
11. See infra text accompanying notes 53-126. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 127-142. 
13. 467 u.s. 229 (1984). 
14. Id. at 240-41. Midkiff involved the constitutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform 
Act of 1967, which allowed lessees to request that the state condemn real property from 
lessors of single family tracts containing at least five acres. After condemnation, the state 
could sell portions of the tracts to the lessees. Id. at 233-34. The Act's purpose was to 
break up large estates because "concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing 
the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public 
tranquility and welfare." Id. at 232. 
15. Even before Midkiff, the public use requirement had been interpreted very 
broadly. See e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In that case, the Supreme Court 
found an eminent domain action constitutional even though most of the land taken was 
to be sold to private individuals. I d. at 33. Another blatant example of the early frustra-
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fore, just compensation now stands as virtually the only judicial 
safeguard against governmental interferences with private prop-
erty that cannot be justified under the police powers. 16 
A. The Meaning of Just Compensation 
The Supreme Court's opinions are replete with notions of 
"fairness" and "indemnity" as the standards for deciding if a 
condemnee has been justly compensated. For example, in a 1973 
case, then-Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he constitutional re-
quirement of just compensation derives as much content from 
the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from techni-
cal concepts of property law."17 The Court has indirectly ap-
proved an indemnity standard for decades by reiterating the fol-
lowing phrase from Olson v. United States:18 "[An owner of 
property] is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily 
as if his property had not been taken."19 
Although the Court has also directly recognized that the in-
demnity principle is inherent in the just compensation require-
ment, it has simultaneously admitted that this principle "has 
not been given its full and literal force. "20 The reason given for 
permitting deviations from this standard is the "need for a rela-
tively objective working rule."21 The working rule which has 
been adopted is the fair market value of the property taken. 
1. The meaning of fair market value 
Fair market value is purported to be what a willing seller 
would pay and a willing buyer would accept, 22 yet there are 
tions encountered in asserting the public use requirement is City of Oakland v. Oakland 
Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 
1007 (1986). The California Supreme Court stated that the acquisition and operation of 
a sports franchise could be a public use. See id. at 70-73, 646 P.2d at 841-43, 183 Cal. 
Rptr. at 679-81. 
16. See Durham, supra note 6, at 1284 (discussing just compensation as the only 
remaining check after Midkiff). 
17. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (citation omitted). See also 
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950) (just compensa-
tion equated with concepts of fairness and equity). 
18. 292 u.s. 246 (1934). 
19. ld. at 255. Accord, United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 
(1979) (quoting the Olson standard of indemnity). 
20. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511 (noting practical difficul-
ties in achieving desired fifth amendment requirements). 
21. ld. (adopting fair market value as workable objective rule). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 
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many values, such as good will, lost profits, and sentimental at-
tachment, that have been labeled "speculative" and "non-trans-
ferable" and are therefore omitted from a determination of fair 
market value,23 regardless of the role they might actually play in 
an open-market transaction.24 
The Court has recognized that there will be situations in 
which fair market value may not be appropriate. These situa-
tions have been defined as those in which "market value has 
been too difficult to find, or when its application would result' in 
manifest injustice to owner or public."25 
Recently, in United States v. 50 Acres of Land26 ("Dun-
canville"), the city of Duncanville, Texas argued that fair mar-
ket value was not an appropriate standard for compensating a 
public condemnee.27 Instead, the city asserted that the basic in-
demnity principle in the just compensation clause could only be 
satisfied by awarding the cost of substitute facilities. 28 Nonethe-
less, the Duncanville court concluded that the risk of a "wind-
fall" to the city existed and that there was no need to depart 
from the objective fair-market-value standard.29 In her concur-
rence, Justice O'Connor opined that the city had not established 
that "market value in this case deviated significantly from the 
(1961) (reimbursement determined by price willing buyer would pay willing seller); 
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (market value equaling cash value from 
willing buyer to willing seller); City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915) (market 
value determined by what purchaser would in fact pay under normal conditions). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 514 (non-transfera-
ble values such as owner's special need for land not compensable); United States v. Com-
modities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 126 (1950) (retention value not normally a factor 
in calculating current compensation requirement); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (loss of non-transferable values treated as part of the burden 
of citizenship). See generally 3 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN§ 8.61 (rev. 3d 
ed. 1985) (remote and speculative values not considered in determining compensation); 1 
L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN§ 14 (2d ed. 1953) (non-trans-
ferable loss due to personal need or sentiment not compensable). 
24. For example, in United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) the Court held that 
fair market value need not include value added due to the proximity of the tract to 
adjacent federal lands in which the condemners held permits since the government cre-
ated the interests. Id. at 493. But see Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse v. United 
States 409 U.S. 470 {1973) (value of expectation of lease renewal figured in fair market 
value). 
25. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). 
26. 469 u.s. 24 (1984). 
27. See id. at 26 (claiming cost of replacement site and facilities). 
28. See id. (asserting higher compensation award needed because of city's duty to 
replace condemned public facility). 
29. See id. at 34 (increased value of new facilities as much a windfall as unused 
compensation). 
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indemnity principle. . . . "30 Duncanville derived support from 
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land31 ("Lutheran Synod"), a 
case decided five years earlier. The Lutheran Synod Court ruled 
that a private condemnee was justly compensated by application 
of the fair-market-value standard even though the condemned 
property could only be replaced with more expensive substi-
tutes. 32 The "fear" in that case was that the condemnee would 
receive a "windfall" if substitute facilities were never purchased 
or, if purchased, were subsequently sold. 33 
What then is just compensation? The rhetoric of the Su-
preme Court cases can be assimilated to produce the following 
elusive answer: just compensation is the fair market value of the 
property taken (as determined pursuant to the court's con-
strained definition of that term) unless it can be shown not sim-
ply that such an award fails to fully indemnify the owner, but 
that it fails to indemnify to such an extent that it is very unfair. 
2. The meaning of fairness 
The Duncanville and Lutheran Synod cases indicate that 
the Court's definition of fairness would lead circuitously back to 
the question-begging answer formulated above: fair market value 
is fair unless it is very unfair. These opinions do, however, sug-
gest using certain criteria, oblique as they may be, to determine 
when an award based on fair market value is fair. First, the fair-
market-value standard is deemed fair if using some other stan-
dard increases the possibility that the condemnee would receive 
a "windfall."34 Second, another standard must be used if using 
the fair-market-value standard will produce "manifest injus-
tice."35 This latter criterion has not been defined although it ap-
pears that the two criteria are mutually exclusive. In other 
words, if there is a possibility of a windfall to the condemnee, 
30. Id. at 37 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (indemnity principle requiring just compen-
sation proof on case-by-case basis). 
31. 441 u.s. 506 (1979). 
32. See id. at 514-17 (full indemnity does not require compensation for unique 
needs which cause higher replacement costs). 
33. See id. at 516 (only speculation that similar facilities would be acquired and 
maintained). 
34. See Duncanville, 469 U.S. at 34-36 (fair market value proper as objective stan-
dard preventing compensation for subjective values). 
35. See Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 512-13 (market value inappropriate where re-
sult is substantial deviation from fifth amendment principles). 
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fair market value will not be considered manifestly unjust and 
the fair-market-value standard will be deemed fair. 
It is not surprising that the Court has consistently' fallen 
back on the fair-market-value standard rather than attempt to 
define fairness more articulately. As Professor Michelman noted 
in his seminal article on just compensation, "fairness resists be-
ing cast into a simple, impersonal, easily stated formula. "36 
Courts and scholars, realizing this, tend to emphasize formulas 
rather than fairness in determining just compensation. 
3. The government's susceptibility to "fiscal illusion" 
Law and economic theorists maintain that economic effi-
ciency provides an accurate and manageable formula for deter-
mining just compensation.37 Economic efficiency requires weigh-
ing an action's costs against its benefits. 38 Economic efficiency is 
36. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1250. Michelman concludes: 
We should not be surprised at the emergence of a number of partial, imperfect, 
or over broad surrogate rules from among which judges may pick and choose in 
order to avoid explaining compensability decisions in terms by which a litigant 
is, in effect, simply told that his sensation of having been victimized is not 
justified. 
Id. at 1249. 
37. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 6, at 571, 610 (adopting goal of economic 
efficiency as framework for evaluation of compensation). See also Durham, supra note 6, 
at 1301 (efficient just compensation obtained by reducing cost/benefit analysis to uni-
form formula). See generally R. PosNER, supra note 6, at § 3.6 (discussing economic 
analysis of compensation questions in eminent domain actions). 
38. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (2d ed. 1989) (de-
fining efficiency). Polinsky labels this concept of efficiency as "more intuitive" than other 
technical concepts such as Pareto optimality. Id. at 7 n.4. A thorough examination of 
these various concepts of economic efficiency is beyond the scope of this article since the 
premise presented is that uniformly equating just compensation with efficiency falls 
short of the fifth amendment's fairness dictate due to the inability to value all factors 
present in each takings case. See, e.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement 
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 388-89 (1981) (criticizing proponents of eco-
nomic efficiency for failing to recognize moral judgments inherent in their supposedly 
objective calculations); Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics 
in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 307, 309 (1979) (certain important goods and services have no 
measurable objective value in terms of market pricing); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 
8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 641, 644-47 (1980) (simplified models of efficiency ignore non-mone-
tizable social and moral variables). But see G. BECKER, THE EcoNOMIC APPROACH TO 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 6-14 (1976) (illustrating economic method of calculating prices of non-
market commodities such as health, marriage, children, political choice, etc.); Posner, 
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119-20 (1979) (eco-
nomic analysis based on value of each aspect of society expressed in dollars or dollar 
equivalents). If Posner recognizes that certain behaviors may be outside the scope of his 
calculations, he submits that any workable theory of analysis must necessarily be more 
simplistic than real life. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REv. 757, 
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achieved when benefits outweigh costs. A particular taking 
would only be efficient when the governmental entity included 
all ·the costs of its eminent domain action in its cost/benefit 
analysis for the specific project. 39 
The ability to ignore certain costs under the Court's defini-
tion of fair market value renders the government susceptible to 
operating under a "fiscal illusion."40 This theory suggests that 
governmental entities will make inefficient taking or regulatory 
decisions because they have been permitted to externalize costs 
rather than required to include them in their budgetary outlay.41 
The ripple effect of this result is that the political process, like 
the public use requirement, is no longer an effective check on 
takings decisions.42 
The Supreme Court's retort to the fiscal illusion phenome-
non would predictably be the same given in response to attacks 
upon the appropriateness of the fair-market-value standard as 
the measure of just compensation. That answer has been that 
such inequities are tolerated because of the need for a "workable 
measure of valuation," which strikes a "fair balance between the 
public's need and the claimant's loss."43 The fallacy of this re-
773-74 (1975). For an explanation and discussion of the various concepts of efficiency, see 
R. PosNER, supra note 6, at § 1.2. 
39. See generally Durham, supra note 6, at 1278 n.5 (economic efficiency equated 
with cost versus benefit analysis). Professor Durham concludes that only costs that are 
"large, fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable" should be included in the computation 
of just compensation. Id. at 1302. 
40. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 6, at 620 (regulatory decisions influenced by 
attempts to avoid monetary expenditures). Blume and Rubinfeld discuss fiscal illusion as 
a factor for determining when compensation should be made. See id. at 621 (compensa-
tion correcting fiscal illusion by requiring budgetary outlay). Professor Durham uses fis-
cal illusion to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the fair-market-value standard as the 
measure of just compensation. See Durham, supra note 6, at 1300-01. Durham notes: 
Measuring just compensation by the market value of the property taken 
greatly increases the probability that a government's eminent domain action 
will be inefficient. Because the government is not accountable for all the costs 
of the taking, "fiscal illusion" may cause underestimation of costs and fail to 
deter if not induce inefficient actions. 
ld. (footnotes omitted). But see Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 
HARV. L. REv. 511, 567-68 & nn. 167-69 (1985) (fiscal illusion is an improper governmen-
tal assumption that disregards costs more than benefits). 
41. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 6, at 621 (monetary accountability as pre-
requisite to socially responsible decision-making). 
42. See Durham, supra note 6, at 1293-97 (takings motivated by political self-inter-
est and ability to ignore social costs by both officials and voting public). 
43. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1979) (market 
value as tool to balance public and private needs); see also United States v. 50 Acres of 
Land, 469 U.S. 24,33 (1984) (market measure achieves balance between public need and 
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tort is that it places the emphasis on valuation rather than fair-
ness and indemnity. The weakness of the economic efficiency 
equation for just compensation stems from this same imbalance 
since there are many costs which are not sufficiently monetizable 
to be included in the computation. 44 Demoralization costs are 
one example. 
4. Demoralization costs 
Professor Michelman used demoralization costs as part of a 
utilitarian formula for answering the initial question about 
whether a compensable taking has occurred, but the concept has 
relevance to the just compensation question as well.46 
Michelman's inquiry was "what criteria of compensability will 
emerge if the practice of compensating is taken to have the pur-
pose of quieting people's unease about the possibility of being 
strategically exploited[.]"46 Michelman also recognized that it 
private loss). Calabresi and Melamed have explained that this balance is maintained 
through application of an objective fair-market-value standard, which recognizes that it 
may not fully indemnify, because eminent domain involves application of liability rules, 
rather than property rules, to achieve distributional as well as efficiency goals. See Cala-
bresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1110 (1972). A property rule, unlike a liability rule, 
involves transferring entitlements in a voluntary transaction complete with the strategic 
behaviors usually exerted by buyers and sellers in an open-market transaction. See id. at 
1106-07. If, as the Court enunciates, just compensation should reflect what a willing 
buyer and seller would agree upon, then it follows that property rules rather than liabil-
ity rules should govern. The justification for adopting a liability rule instead is that given 
the market and its concomitant transactional costs, the government could not afford to 
pursue many, if not most, of its distributional goals. See id. at 1108-10. The response 
that most scholars have given to this fact is that if the government cannot afford to pay, 
it cannot afford to act. See generally Durham, supra note 6, at 1312-13 (requiring gov-
ernment to bear costs reinforces fifth amendment protection); Michelman, supra note 6, 
at 1181 (absent full compensation society cannot act). Professor Epstein agrees that dis-
tributional goals should not be involved in takings decisions. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 
4, at 112 (police power not encompassing redistribution of benefits without compen-
sation). 
44. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
45. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1213 (compensation required where activity 
would otherwise be critically demoralizing). Michelman notes: 
"Demoralization costs" are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary 
to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically 
from the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capi-
talized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incen-
tives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their 
sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they them-
selves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion. 
Id. at 1214 (footnote omitted). 
46. Id. at 1217 (systematic exploitation more demoralizing than everyday risk of 
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would be difficult to place a value on demoralization costs;" Yet, 
as this article will demonstrate, the uniform exclusion of these 
costs in the abstract permits compensation to unnecessarily fall 
short of the constitutional dictate by allowing real opportunities 
for "strategically exploiting" property owners. 
B. Practically Achieving Just Compensation 
This article does not suggest that an amorphous approach 
giving consideration to all possible variables in determining fair-
ness and indemnity would be acceptable for determining the 
first three questions in the takings analysis.48 Once the taking 
for public use determination is made, the fairness and indemnity 
dictate of the fifth amendment would best be served if the com-
pensation question were submitted to the fact finder with appro-
priate jnstructions.49 If juries are permitted to decide questions 
as nebulous as mental anguish and pain and suffering, they 
should be allowed to determine a "fair" condemnation award. 
The evidence should include facts bearing upon, inter alia, effi-
ciency, 50 the fiscal illusion phenomenon, demoralization costs, 
and fair market value.51 This approach would transfer the em-
phasis from valuation to fairness and indemnity which would 
restructure the just compensation requirement into a more effec-
accident). 
47. See id. at 1215 (acknowledging even the victim may be unable to value subjec-
tive losses like security and incentive). Professor Durham concludes that since demorali-
zation costs are not sufficiently monetizable, they should be excluded from just compen-
sation. See Durham, supra note 6, at 1303-04. 
48. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4; Epstein, supra note 8, at 4 (criticizing 
lack of 'set formula' for determining when taking has occurred). 
49. See CAL. C1v. Paoc. CoDE § 1263.320(b) (Deering 1981) (property without rele-
vant market to be valued by any just and equitable method). 
50. This means evidence on the aggregate costs and benefits of the eminent domain 
action. 
51. See, e.g., State v. Munson, 174 So. 2d 923, 925 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (appraisals 
ranging from $2,750 per acre to $10,457 per acre); State v. Frisby, 260 Minn. 70, 73-74, 
108 N.W.2d 769, 771-72 (1961) (appraisals divergent enough to support award of $1,750 
on damage claim of $10,000); Linzell v. Ohio Nat'l Bank, 101 Ohio App. 17, 20, 137 
N.E.2d 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1956) (expert appraisals ranging from $65,400 to $154,790). 
See generally Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Inciden-
tal Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 73 (1957) (surveys showing appraisal variances ranging from 
56% to over 500% even among objective state appraisers). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
73.071 (West 1987) (compensation for business over five years old); TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 
13-11-105 to -107 (1987) (award for relocation expenses); VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 25-239 to-
241 (1985) (relocation and home acquisition compensation). 
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tive safeguard against governmental abuses of private 
property. 62 
Analyzing the rules governing the compensation awarded 
future interest holders provides empirical evidence of the unfair-
ness which emanates from strictly adhering to any one objective 
standard. Even if it is maintained that the initial application of 
the fair-market-value standard does not contradict notions of 
fairness and indemnity to the extent that the Supreme Court 
would find that the just compensation clause has been abridged, 
using that standard to determine the allocation of the award 
among the owners of the present and future estates does contra-
vene the fifth amendment's just compensation mandate in cer-
tain instances. Use of the fair-market-value standard subjects 
owners of some future interests to a double dosage of the inequi-
ties that even the Court has recognized are implicit in equating 
just compensation with an objective fair-market-value standard 
since this standard is used to determine both the value of the 
undivided fee and then the separate interest of the present and 
future estate. The fiscal illusion phenomenon and the signifi-
cance of demoralization costs are illustrated by the unique facts 
of Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. County of Nueces, a Texas future 
interest case set forth in the next section. A review of the vari-
ous types of future interests and the allocation they receive in 
condemnation actions illustrates that "blind imitation" of objec-
tive standards unnecessarily sacrifices fairness and indemnity in 
favor of procedural simplicity. 
III. PREVAILING STANDARDS FoR CoMPENSATING FuTURE 
INTEREST HOLDERS 
There are five future interests which can be created in a 
grant of a present interest in real property. Reversions, possibili-
ties of reverter, and powers of termination are future interests 
52. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943) (theoretically, indem-
nity measured on case-by-case basis). The Supreme Court has recognized that the facts 
of each case should determine just compensation, but the interposition of the fair-mar-
ket-value standard detracts from this emphasis. See id. at 37 4 (necessary assumptions in 
market valuation disregard finer elements of true value). The Court stated: 
It is conceivable that an owner's indemnity should be measured in various 
ways depending upon the circumstances of each case and that no general 
formula should be used for the purpose. In an effort, however, to find some 
practical standard, the courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of 
market value. 
Id. at 373-74. 
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which a grantor retains when he grants a life estate, a fee simple 
determinable, and a fee simple subject to a condition subse-
quent, respectively. 63 Remainders are future interests created in 
third parties following the grant of a life estate, and executory 
interests are future interests created in third parties following 
the grant of a defeasible fee. 64 
A. Current Compensation Rights Of Owners Of Reversions 
And Remainders 
Courts and legislatures have consistently recognized that 
the owners of reversions and remainders, whether vested or con-
tingent, are entitled to share in a condemnation award based on 
the fair market value of the entire fee, although the method of 
compensation has varied. One approach places a monetary value 
on the life estate through the use of mortality tables and then 
awards the balance to the reversioner or the remainderman. 66 
Another frequently used method places the award in trust pay-
ing the life tenant the interest and giving the reversioner or re-
mainderman the principal upon the life tenant's death. 66 If the 
53. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO EsTATES IN LAND AND FuTURE INTER-
ESTS 56-62 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing future interests created or retained by grantors). See 
also L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 17-19, 28-32 (2d ed. 1984) 
(defining and explaining future interests in grantors). A power of termination is often 
used synonymously with a right of re-entry. See generally L. SIMES, supra, at 31 (right of 
grantor more accurately termed a power); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 24 comment b 
(1936) (power of termination is a more accurate description). 
54. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 53, at 62-66 (defining rights of third 
parties with future interests); see also C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY 110 (1962) (distinguishing remainders and executory interests in third parties). 
55. See 4 P. NICHOLS, supra note 23, at §§ 12.46 - 12.46[1] (discussing development 
of actuarial data to value life estate). "Generally it may be said that in effecting such 
apportionment a vested remainderman is entitled to the difference between the market 
value of the undivided fee and the present value of the life estate." Id. at § 12.46[2] 
(footnotes omitted). See also Browder, The Condemnation of Future Interests, 48 VA. L. 
REv. 461, 468-69 (1962) (discussing valuation and award of each interest). The Uniform 
Eminent Domain Code calls for valuing the respective interests of the life tenant and 
remainderman. See UNIFORM EMINENT DoMAIN CoDE§ 1015 (1974). Other state statutes 
call for determining the respective values of the life tenancy and reversion or remainder. 
See e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-4-190 (1977) (court determines present value of life estate giving 
excess award to remaindermen); CAL. Civ. PROC. CoDE § 1265.420 (Deering 1981) (court 
option to distribute award based on respective values of life tenancy and remainder in-
terest); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.188 (West 1986) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 8.78 (Calla-
ghan 1984)) (jury shall determine appropriate compensation for owners of any interest). 
56. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 79, § 24 (Law. Co-op 1978) (entire award placed in 
trust with annual income to life tenant and principal to remaindermen upon termina-
tion). See also CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 1265.420(c) (Deering 1981) (court option to hold 
compensation in trust). If the remainder is contingent, this method is more appropriate 
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land is already subject to a trust, this method is obviously the 
most logical, but a pre-existing trust has not been considered a 
prerequisite. 57 An additional but less popular solution is to use 
the condemnation award to buy a tract similar to the one that 
was condemned and impose the same interests. 58 
B. Current Compensation Rights of Holders of Possibility of 
Reverter, Power of Termination and Executory Interests 
Unlike the owners of remainders and reversions, the owners 
of the other three types of future interests have not been per-
ceived as being necessarily entitled to share in the condemnation 
award or to have their interest protected in any manner. 59 One 
view relies on the falsehood that the interests do not constitute 
estates in land and therefore the constitutional mandate does 
not apply.60 Perhaps the most popular justification has been that 
since the future interest holder may or may not have been entitled to a present interest 
in the property. Therefore, a valuation prior to the life tenant's death would be 
impossible. 
57. See United States v. 122,000 Acres of Land, 57 F. Supp. 421, 422 (N.D. Tex. 
1944) (court duty to preserve interests of remaindermen by supervising investment and 
preservation of condemnation award). The court commented: 
The thought is, that both the life tenant and the remainderman have rights 
which cannot be distributed by the conversion of the land into money. Prior to 
a sale, the life tenant has only the right to use the land. After sale, he has only 
the right to the use of his interest in the proceeds. But both before and after 
sale, the remainder interest has a right to the corpus, or, substitute principal, 
undiminished. 
Id. at 423. See also CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 1265.420(c) (Deering 1981) (listing optional 
arrangement designed to preserve interests of both life tenant and remainderman). See 
generally UNIFORM EMINENT DoMAIN CoDE§ 1015 (1974) (providing alternative arrange-
ments to preserve interests of life tenant and remainderman). 
58. See United States v. 380 Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. 6, 7 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (court-
ordered proceeds to be reinvested in other suitable real estate in which parties retain 
same interests as before condemnation). See Stoyles, Condemnation of Future Interests, 
43 IowA L. REv. 241, 256 (1958) (advocates reinvesting compensation in similar prop-
erty). But see L. SIMES, supra note 53, at 117 (uniqueness of land and limitations on 
court authority calling practicality of reinvestment into question). 
59. The remaining three future interests are more frequently than not treated to-
gether by courts and commentators since their differences are not considered significant 
enough to warrant separate treatment. See Fifer v. Allen, 228 Ill. 507, 81 N.E. 1105, 1109 
(1907) (executory interest not present estate but expectancy based on happening of fu-
ture event). See generally L. SIMES, supra note 53, at 25-32 (executory interest, possibil-
ity of reverter, power of termination all arise at termination of determinable fee). 
60. See, e.g., City of Charlotte v. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n, 278 N.C. 26, 
30, 178 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1971) (possibility of reverter not an estate in land); Chandler v. 
Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 125 Mass. 544, 547 (1878) (holder of possibility of re-
verter not person with property entitled to damages). But see Lawson v. State, 107 
Wash. 2d 444, 457-59, 730 P.2d 1308, 1315-16 (1986) (recognizing reversionary interests 
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possibilities of reverter, powers of termination and executory in-
terests are "too remote and speculative" to be capable of valua-
tion and therefore the entire award should go to the defeasible 
fee owner. 61 
1. The Restatement's mew of compensating future interests 
holders 
In 1936 the Restatement of Property promulgated rules 
designed to relieve some of this unfairness. 62 The Restatement 
specifically calls for valuing the estate as if it were an "estate in 
fee simple absolute."63 Thus, pursuant to Supreme Court dic-
tates, the unrestricted fee's fair market value would determine 
the amount of the total award. The purpose of the Restatement 
rules is to aid in deciding how this award should be allocated 
between the owners of the defeasible fee and the future interest. 
Unfortunately, these rules simply perpetuate the sin inherent in 
earlier justifications denying compensation to owners of pos-
sibilities of reverter, powers of termination and executory inter-
ests. The Restatement's rules provide that a possibility of re-
verter or power of termination has no value and therefore is not 
entitled to any compensation unless the condition requiring re-
version to the grantor or his heirs is "imminent."64 This immi-
nency test has proved elusive.65 If the event is imminent, the 
as estates in land because owner of the interest gets possession of fee upon breach of 
condition). 
61. See, e.g., Romero v. Department of Pub. Works, 17 Cal. 2d 189, 196, 109 P.2d 
662, 665 (1941) (reversionary interest of no compensable value prior to breach); Fifer v. 
Allen, 228 Ill. 507, 521, 81 N.E. 1105, 1109 (1907) (court's refusal to protect executory 
interest as mere expectancy); Erie Ry. v. State, 38 A.D.2d 463, 466, 330 N.Y.S.2d 700, 
703 (App. Div. 1972) (possibility of reverter too remote to support compensation award). 
See generally 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 199 (1962) (discussing general rule disallow-
ing compensation for reversionary interests). For a discussion of the various reasons own-
ers of possibilities of reverter have been denied compensation, see Browder, supra note 
55, at 473 (listing traditional reasons to avoid compensation for reversionary interests); 
Stoyles, supra note 58, at 247-53 Gudicial reasons justifying non-compensation); Note, 
Compensation for Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of Termination Under Condem-
nation Law, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 787, 788 (1969) (court positions refusing compensation for 
possibilities of reverter). 
62. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 53 (1936) (rules governing valuation and distri-
bution of condemnation awards). 
63. I d. comment a. 
64. See id. comments b & c (holder of future interest not entitled to share unless 
condition probably will occur within reasonably short time). 
65. In Chew v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 307, 312, 161 A.2d 621, 623-24 (1960), the 
court found the terminating event was imminent since the property was owned for rail-
road purposes and the railroad had applied for permission to abandon. However, in Peo-
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Restatement provides for making an allocation in proportion to 
the value of the future and present interests. 66 
Most courts follow the Restatement's test, resulting in the 
denial of compensation to the future interest owner in the vast 
majority of cases.67 Its rules have also been occasionally com-
ple v. City of Fresno, 210 Cal. App. 2d 500, 517, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853, 863 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1962), the court found no imminence although the city had adopted a master develop-
ment plan which indicated that the property could be used as a highway. See also Carter 
v. New York Cent. R.R., 73 N.Y.S.2d 610, 613 (App. Div.) (no imminence even though 
railroad had requested permission to abandon), aff'd, 273 A.D. 884, 77 N.Y.S.2d 265 
(App. Div. 1947), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 540, 80 N.E.2d 671 (1948); Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. 
County of Nueces, 716 S.W.2d 615, 618-19 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (no imminence even 
though county plans included uses violating property restrictions), rev'd, 736 S.W.2d 629 
(Tex. 1987). But see United States v. 2,184.81 Acres, 45 F. Supp. 681, 684 (W.D. Ark. 
1942) (court determination that terminating event on a grant for school purposes was 
imminent since school district sought dissolution). Although the Restatement only pro-
vides that an award should be divided according to the proportionate values of the pre-
sent and future estates, the district court ruled that the future interest holder should be 
awarded the value of the land and the present estate owner the value of the buildings it 
placed on the lands, less salvage value if the buildings could be removed. See id. at 684-
85. See also Lawson v. State, 107 Wash. 2d 444, 456-57, 730 P.2d 1308, 1315 (1986) 
(found imminence where statute changed use of property from railroad right of way to 
other public use). 
66. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 53, comment C (distribution if event immi-
nent). The Restatement declares: 
!d. 
If, viewed from the time of the commencement of an eminent domain proceed-
ing, and not taking into account any changes in the use of the land sought to 
be condemned which may result as a consequence of such proceeding, the 
event upon which a possessory estate in fee simple defeasible is to end is an 
event the occurrence of which, within a reasonably short period of time, is 
probable, then the amount of damages is ascertained as though the estate were 
a possessory estate in fee simple absolute, and the damages, so ascertained, are 
divided between the owner of the estate in fee simple defeasible and the owner 
of the future interest in such shares as fairly represent the proportionate value 
of the present defeasible possessory estate and of the future interest. 
67. See e.g., United States v. 726.23 Acres of Land, 746 F.2d 1363, 1365 (8th Cir. 
1984) (award proper only where possibility of reverter imminent); Midwestern Develop-
ments., Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 374 F.2d 683, 688 (lOth Cir. 1967) (no compensation due 
where reversion not imminent); United States v. 808.40 Acres of Land, 372 F. Supp. 
1165, 1166 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (event triggering right of reverter not sufficiently imminent to 
support award); People v. City of Fresno, 210 Cal. App. 2d 500, 517, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853, 
863 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (no evidence of imminency to satisfy award); City of Charlotte 
v. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n, 278 N.C. 26, 33, 178 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1971) (no 
value ascertainable where reversion not probable within short period). For a listing of 
earlier cases following the Restatement and refusing to award compensation to owners of 
reversionary interests, see Browder, supra note 55, at 472 n.35. See supra note 65 for 
cases in which the future interest owner was permitted to share in the award due to a 
finding of imminency. One law review note cites three early cases as being additional 
cases in which the future interest owner was allowed to recover. See Note, Compensation 
for Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of Termination Under Condemnation Law, 20 
HASTINGS L.J. 787 (1969) (citing Crowl v. Tidman, Pedrotti v. Marin County, and Lan-
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bined with other justifications when a court rules that the owner 
of the defeasible fee is entitled to the entire award. For example, 
some courts conclude that the fee owner should prevail because 
the eminent domain action excused compliance with the revert-
ing clause. 68 One court determined that the owner of the defeasi-
ble fee should not be "penalized" for the government's action. 69 
Several cases have focused on the parties' intent in ruling both 
for and against the right of the future interest holder to re-· 
cover.70 All of these condemnation cases consistently lack a di-
rect focus on whether the allocation of the initial award satisfies 
the just compensation requirement of the fairness and indem-
nity dictates of the fifth amendment. 
2. Alternatives to the Restatement's approach 
a. The difference-in-value approach. State v. Independent 
School District71 is one of the only cases to expressly find dissat-
isfaction with the Restatement rules because of its failure to 
comply with the just compensation requirement. Although the 
caster School Dist. u. Lancaster County). However, a close reading of these cases reveals 
that the future interest owner was allowed to recover due to exceptional circumstances. 
Pedrotti, for example, involved a clause in the deed. See Pedrotti v. Marin County, 152 
F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1946) (condemnation was transfer of property triggering failure of 
trust), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853 (1946). In Crowl, the condition had already occurred. 
See Crowl v. Tidnam, 198 Okla. 650, 651, 181 P.2d 549, 551 (1947) (sole issue being 
ownership where railroad abandoned purposes specified as condition for possession). And 
in Lancaster, it is unclear whether the grant actually created a fee simple determinable. 
See Lancaster School Dist. v. Lancaster County, 295 Pa. 112, 119-120, 144 A. 901, 903-04 
(1929) (grant of fee to county with only conditional estate to school district). Absent 
such exceptional circumstances or imminency, courts did not begin recognizing a right of 
future interest holders to share in a condemnation award until Ink v. City of Canton, 4 
Ohio St. 2d 51, 212 N.E.2d 574 (1965), and State v. Independent School Dist., 266 Minn. 
85, 123 N.W.2d 121 (1963). 
68. See, e.g., Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. v. City of St. Joseph, 560 
S. W.2d 285, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (holder of fee not in breach even though use no 
longer possible following condemnation); Lyford v. City of Laconia, 75 N.H. 220, 227-28, 
72 A. 1085, 1090 (1909) (no reversion to executory interest holder so long as state public 
use continues); First Reformed Dutch Church v. Croswell, 210 A.D. 294, 295, 206 N.Y.S. 
132, 133 (1924) (disuse occurring only after simultaneous seizure of fee and reverter 
through condemnation). 
69. United States v. 808.40 Acres of Land, 372 F. Supp. 1165, 1166 (E.D. Ky. 1973) 
(fee holder innocent of breach where compliance impossible after government taking). 
70. See, e.g., id. (intent of grantor to prevent voluntary abandonment by grantee); 
Gordy v. Cobb County School Dist., 255 Ga. 26, 27, 334 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1985) (found 
grantor's intent to have estate in property or award continue so long as any community 
club use carried out); State v. Rand, 366 A.2d 183, 195 (Me. 1976) (found grantor's intent 
to create trust rather than determinable fee from language and purposes of gift). 
71. 266 Minn. 85, 95, 123 N.W.2d 121, 129 (1963). 
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Supreme Court of Minnesota simply stated, without elaborating, 
that its state constitution prohibited taking property without 
just compensation, the court held that the Restatement rules 
failed to adequately protect future interests and determined 
that even when a violation of the condition is not imminent, 
some amount, however nominal, should always be awarded to 
the owners of these interests. 72 The court was undaunted though 
the owners of the possibility of reverter had not produced any 
evidence of the value of their separate interest.73 Instead, the 
court recognized that the award was based on the fair market 
value of the undivided fee as determined by the highest and best 
use for the property, and held that the value of the possibility of 
reverter was the difference between the restricted and un-
restricted values of the entire fee. 74 
Two years later, in 1965, the Supreme Court of Ohio also 
found the Restatement rules unsatisfactory in Ink v. City of 
Canton.75 Although this court never mentioned the just compen-
sation clause, the opinion emula~ed the fairness rhetoric found 
throughout United States Supreme Court opinions. For exam-
ple, in acknowledging the general rule that the grantee/owner of 
the defeasible fee is awarded the entire condemnation award, 
the court noted that failing to allow the owner of the future in-
terest to share in an award based on the fair market value of the 
unrestricted fee could give the grantee a "windfall," especially 
when the grantee paid nothing for his interest. 76 The court also 
72. See id. (owners of possibilities of reverter entitled to some compensation for loss 
of their interest in land). 
73. Id. at 91, 123 N.W.2d at 126 (discussion of apportionment undertaken even 
without a prior consideration of market value of future interest). 
74. I d. at 97-98, 123 N.W.2d at 129-30 (award based on comparison of restricted and 
unrestricted value plus likelihood of the abandonment of the use). The court determined: 
If the value [of restricted land], in cases where the realty would have a greater 
market value if devoted to some other practicable purpose, is less than the 
totality of the value, the owner of the possibility of reverter shall be entitled to 
a proportion of the condemnation award expressed by a fraction the denomina-
tor of which is the market value of the realty when devoted to its best practica-
ble use and the numerator of which is the difference between such value and 
the value of the realty applied to the uses to which it is restricted by the terms 
of the deed for such period of time as such use is reasonably to be anticipated. 
Id. at 130 (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original). Only when the restricted and un-
restricted uses were of the same value would the owner of the future interest be entitled 
to only nominal damages. I d. 
75. 4 Ohio St. 2d 51, 57, 212 N.E.2d 574, 578 (1965). 
76. See id. at 55, 212 N.E.2d at 577 (grantee could get full value of the unrestricted 
fee). Compare United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34 (1984) (increased com-
pensation to cover replacement costs an unwarranted windfall to grantee). The Ink court 
789] JUST COMPENSATION 807 
noted that the Restatement rules were intended to absolve the 
harshness of this general rule, but concluded that they did not 
go far enough.77 As in State v. Independent School District, the 
Ink court ruled that the grantor/owner of the possibility of re-
verter was entitled to the difference in value between the re-
stricted and unrestricted fee. 78 The court went further, however, 
and held that any award the grantee received would still be sub-
ject to the same conditions imposed upon the determinable fee. 79 
These two cases prove that courts have been able to formulate 
"workable standards" for valuing interests other than by apply-
ing the Restatement rules or the fair market value standard. 
Due to the lack of a secondary market for either defeasible 
fees or their respective future interests, it is unlikely that there 
would in fact be an ascertainable fair market value for these in-
terests. Using the formula of the difference in value between the 
restricted and unrestricted undivided fee ("difference-in-value 
test") instead is consistent with the Supreme Court's directive 
that some standard other than fair market value must be used 
when the interest at issue has no market value or when that 
value is too difficult to ascertain. 80 
Although the context is different, the difference-in-value 
test also incorporates the Supreme Court's "windfall" criterion. 
In the Duncanville and Lutheran Synod cases, the Court was 
concerned that using some formula other than fair market value 
would result in a windfall to the condemnee. In future interest 
also opined that if the grantee paid full value for the defeasible fee, giving the grantor 
any of the award could result in a windfall to the grantor. See Ink, 4 Ohio St. 2d at 55, 
212 N.E.2d at 577 (grantee received less than full value originally). 
77. See Ink, 4 Ohio St. 2d at 57, 212 N.E.2d at 578 (Restatement rule too harsh). 
78. See id. 55, 212 N.E.2d at 577 (no justification for compensating grantee for use 
he never had). The court in State v. Independent School District used a fraction to ob-
tain the same result. Compare State v. Independent School Dist., 266 Minn. 85, 123 
N.W.2d 121, 130 (1963) (formula becomes the difference between the highest use and the 
restricted use divided by the market value of the highest use) with Ink, 4 Ohio St. 2d at 
55, 212 N.E.2d at 577 (proper award is difference between values of restricted and un-
restricted fee). 
79. See Ink, 4 Ohio St. 2d at 58, 212 N.E.2d at 579 (grantee only entitled to use 
award for same purposes as original gift). Since only a partial condemnation was in-
volved, the court determined that the owners of the possibility of reverter would retain 
their rights in both the remaining land and in the money awarded for the parcel taken. 
I d. 
80. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) (no 
rigid rule for just compensation determination when market value inappropriate). See 
generally 4 P. NICHOLS, supra note 23, at § 12.32[1] & n.4 (fact that property has no 
market value never a reason relied upon for not compensating). 
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situations however, using the fair market value of the un-
restricted fee to determine the grantee's award, which was based 
on the fair market value of an unrestricted fee, would result in a 
windfall to the grantee especially if she paid nothing for the re-
stricted estate. Even if the grantee paid for the defeasible estate, 
it is likely that she paid less than the fair market value for the 
fee since the interest was subject to a restriction. Awarding the 
grantee the restricted value of the fee, then, would "place [the 
grantee] in the same position pecuniarily as if the property had 
not been taken."81 Whether the difference-in-value test in fact 
represents the fair market value of either the defeasible fee or 
the future interest does not detract from the "fairer" result or 
that denying the future interest holder any compensation is 
"very unfair" because it would result in a "windfall" to the de-
feasible estate owner. 
b. Implied trust doctrine. As pointed out above, the Ink 
court apparently concluded that fairness required subjecting the 
grantee's monetary award to the same restrictions which the 
grantor had placed upon the determinable fee. The reason was 
that the grantee city had undertaken a "fiduciary obligation" to 
use the property only as a public park.82 In a 1976 case, State v. 
Rand,83 the Maine high court reached a similar result by ex-
pressly finding that the deed did not convey a fee simple deter-
minable creating a possibility of reverter in the grantor or his 
heirs, but a trust with general charitable intent which permitted 
application of the doctrine of cy pres.84 This holding, while 
prohibiting the possibility of reverter owner from sharing in the 
award, did allow the city/grantee to use the entire award to cre-
ate a new park.85 
While the Rand court viewed the deed as creating a trust, a 
year later a Missouri court combined the trust concepts with the 
determinable fee concept and concluded that a conveyance cre-
ated a "fee in trust" in the city burdened by a possibility of re-
verter in the grantor. 86 The application of cy pres was not dis-
81. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse. Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 
473-74 (1973) (owner entitled to same pecuniary position as if property not taken). 
82. See Ink, 4 Ohio St. 2d at 58, 212 N.E.2d 574, 579 (1965). 
83. 366 A.2d 183 (Me. 1976). The city/grantee received land to be maintained as a 
public park. The grant called for completion of the park within two years and the perma-
nent maintenance of a plaque honoring the grantor's parents. I d. at 186. 
84. I d. at 195-96. 
85. Id. at 199. 
86. See Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. v. City of St. Joseph, 560 S.W.2d 
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cussed, however, and the city was given the entire award 
apparently unencumbered. 87 In 1985, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia cited the City of St. Joseph and the Restatement in 
Gordy v. Cobb County School District88 in ruling that the 
grantee was entitled to the entire award for the partial condem-
nation.89 Although the trust issue was not discussed, the court 
still ruled, in a footnote, that the award would be subject to the 
possibility of reverter if either the money or the remaining land 
was used contrary to the conditions. 90 
As with remainders and reversions, the implied trust doc-
trine has been used in the future interest context to allocate the 
initial award even though the interest being condemned was not 
held in trust.91 Similarly, a determination that a trust was cre-
ated in the original conveyance should not be a prerequisite to 
determining that the award granted to the owner of a defeasible 
fee should be subject to the same conditions. Courts are evi-
dently predisposed to finding a trust and then applying trust 
principles in order to provide themselves with a set of neatly-
packaged rules for obtaining a fair result. 
In order to take advantage of this packaging, courts have 
had to stretch both the law and the facts. For example, in Rand, 
the court dismissed the generally successful argument that the 
presence of a reverter clause negates general charitable intent by 
finding that the reverter clause in the deed at issue applied only 
to a time requirement and not to the condition of maintaining a 
park.92 In Hamman v. City of Houston,93 the court held a trust 
285, 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (held property as defeasible fee in trust subject to possibil-
ity of reverter if use abandoned). 
87. See id. at 289 (remanded for lower court to distribute total award to city). The 
heirs did assert that they were entitled to the award since the grantor did not intend to 
dedicate the property to public use indefinitely. Id. at 286. See also Hamman v. City of 
Houston, 362 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (partial condemnation case in which 
city was entitled to entire award subject to restrictions of original trust). 
88. 255 Ga. 26, 334 S.E.2d 688 (1985). 
89. See id. at 27, S.E.2d at 689 (affirming award of entire compensation to grantee). 
90. Id. at 27 n.1, 334 S.E.2d at 689 n.l. 
91. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing awards to 
remaindermen). 
92. See Rand, 366 A.2d at 195 n.20 (placement of language indicating intent for 
reversion only if park not completed within two year period). Under the law of trusts, 
courts may use the doctrine of cy pres to carry out the general charitable intent of a 
testator if the particular charitable purpose specified in the will fails for any reason. 
Since the testator has not ordinarily foreseen the impossibility of the gift, the court must 
find some indication of what general charitable alternative the testator might have ap-
proved if the problem was contemplated. See 4A A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS§ 399.2 
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was created· without specifically finding the necessary charitable 
intent and despite a reverter clause. 94 That court also cited cases 
which did not discuss trusts but rather defeasible fees. 95 
The courts' penchant for such doctrinal grab-bagging is not 
limited to this area of the law.96 However, on the question of 
compensating future interest owners, courts should overtly em-
phasize allocating a condemnation award in a manner which 
complies with the dictate of the fifth amendment instead of con-
torting or avoiding trust principles. Giving the entire award to 
the defeasible fee owner is unfair because, as discussed above, it 
gives the owner a windfall. Failing to award the defeasible fee 
owner any money, however, would ignore that he was the owner 
of the taken property. 
Subjecting an award granted to the owner of the defeasible 
fee to the conditions of the initial grant satisfies the just com-
pensation clause, not because it complies with trust principles, 
but because it indemnifies the condemnee while avoiding "mani-
(4th ed. 1988). When the donor has made provisions in the event the specified purpose 
cannot be fulfilled, the doctrine of cy pres is inapplicable. An express alternative gener-
ally indicates testator's intent to provide only for specific charitable purposes rather than 
to leave the general charitable gift needed to invoke cy pres. I d. 
93. 362 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). 
94. I d. at 404-05 (negating heir's assertion of grant of easement but calling grant a 
trust rather than defeasible fee). There must be a particular intent to confer benefits 
through the medium of a trust and not through some related or similar device. See 1 A. 
Sco'IT, supra note 92, at § 23 (express trust created only where settlor clearly intends 
trust relationship). Many cases have determined a trust was created without analyzing 
the conveying document. See, e.g., Pedrotti v. Marin County, 152 F.2d 829, 830 (9th Cir. 
1946) (discussing testator's grant as trust without construing language of will as to form 
of grant), cert denied, 328 U.S. 853 (1946). But see Rand, 366 A.2d at, 195 (determina-
tion of grant as trust or conditional gift dependent on finding testator's intent from con-
struction of will). 
95. Hamman, 362 S.W.2d at 405 (failure of use due to taking is not an event causing 
reverter when land held is as defeasible fee). The court cited First Reformed Dutch 
Church v. Croswell, 210 A.D. 294, 206 N.Y.S. 132 (1924) and Romero v. Department of 
Public Works, 17 Cal. 2d 189, 109 P.2d 662 (1941). Both of these cases simply followed 
the Restatement rules. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text discussing the Re-
statement position. See also Comment, The Effect of Condemnation Proceedings by 
Eminent Domain Upon a Possibility of Reverter or Power of Termination, 19 VILL. L. 
REv. 137, 154-55 & n.llO (1973) (discussing erroneous use of authority in Hamman). 
96. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1249 (discussing emergence of rules a judge 
may use to justify decision he deems fair). Michelman states: 
If the rules cannot always guide a sentient judge to his decision, they may still 
render good service as props to imbue that decision with the appearance of 
ordinariness and impersonality, thereby enabling the judge to decide the "cor-
rect'' issue (that of fairness) without being intolerably dictatorial and smug 
about it. 
Id. at 1249-50 (emphasis in original). 
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fest injustice" and the possibility of a windfall. In other words, 
an award subject to the original grant's conditions is fair. 
Ambiguity arises when deciding whether restricting the en-
tire award (based upon the unrestricted fair market value) is 
more fair than restricting only the difference in value between 
the restricted and unrestricted fee. Which is more fair? Subject-
ing the entire award to the restrictions imposed in the deed 
gives the grantee no more than he had before. However, the dif-
ficulty arises when the grantee attempts to reinvest the money 
in a manner which complies with the restrictions. Due to the 
problems involved in finding and assessing replacement proper-
ties, this option is disfavored with other types of future 
interests. 97 
In a partial condemnation case, the award could easily be 
applied towards the upkeep or expansion of the remaining prop-
erty.98 A workable rule would give the grantee the entire award, 
subject to the conditions in a partial condemnation case, but 
would split the award based upon the difference in value be-
tween the restricted and unrestricted fee in a total condemna-
tion case. 99 
It is not suggested that the rules outlined above should be 
determinative in all cases of condemnation of a fee simple defea-
sible. In all takings cases, the just compensation question should 
be directly responsive to the fairness and indemnity dictate of 
the fifth amendment rather than to a predetermined standard. 
The unquestioned equating of just compensation with the Re-
97. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
98. See Gordy v. Cobb County School Dist., 255 Ga. 26, 27 n.l, 334 S.E.2d 688, 689 
n.l (1985) (restricting use of condemnation award to grantor's original purpose). In par-
tial condemnation cases, the award given would obviously be based only on the property 
taken, i.e., the restricted value of that property. If the grantee fails to use the award for 
the remaining property, the grantor would be entitled to the money. See Ink v. City of 
Canton, 4 Ohio St. 2d 51, 58-59, 212 N.E.2d 574, 579 (1965) (grantee entitled to re-
stricted use of award fund based on restricted value of property with excess based on 
unrestricted use awarded to holders of reverter). 
99. Compare Ink, 4 Ohio St. 2d at 58-59, 212 N.E.2d at 579 (award to grantee sub-
ject to same conditions as remaining property) with State v. Independent School Dist., 
266 Minn. 85, 97-98, 123 N.W. 2d 121, 130 (1963) (court using formula to split award 
according to restricted and unrestricted value of fee). Fairness would also require giving 
the grantee the value of any improvements. See City of Laurel v. Powers, 366 So.2d 1079, 
1084 (Miss. 1979) (listing compensation for improvements in the damage award). See 
generally Durham, supra note 6, at 1305 (improvements compensable since directly 
provable in monetary terms); Francis, Eminent Domain Compensation in Western 
States: A Critique of the Fair Market Value Model, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 429, 432 (dis-
cussing Supreme Court awards of compensation for improvements). 
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statement's test fails to address this constitutional query. In fu-
ture interest cases, it would be appropriate for evidence on the 
difference in values, consideration paid, and the effect of a par-
tial taking on the restriction to be presented to a jury which will 
have the ultimate task of determining a fair award. 100 
c. The Mississippi approach. The Mississippi Supreme 
Court has been adamant in promoting fairness rather than the 
Restatement's test or the fair-market-value standard. In a 1962 
case, Hemphill v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 101 the 
supreme court established a two-prong test for compensating fu-
ture interest owners. First, the future interest owner "must be 
the owner of a compensable interest in the condemned prop-
erty." 102 On this question the court established that future in-
terests are compensable. The second prong requires that the "in-
terest must be capable of valuation."103 Although the Hemphill 
court did not reach the value question, it did direct that the 
value of a future interest be determined by the fact finder based 
on appropriate evidence.104 In a subsequent case, Columbus & 
Greenville Railway Co. v. City of Greenwood, 105 the Mississippi 
Supreme Court approved an allocation of $100,000 of a $150,000 
condemnation award to the owner of a possibility of reverter 
which apparently represented the difference in the value of the 
restricted and unrestricted fee. 106 In reaffirming that the com-
pensation question should be determined by the fact finder and 
not the Restatement's test, the court cited Hemphill for the pro-
position that "[t]he jury apparently accepted testimony of an 
expert appraiser. Although the trier of facts was not obliged to 
accept that particular evidence, it could weigh that and other 
testimony in reaching an acceptable conclusion as to the quan-
tum of damages. "107 
100. Statutes limiting the duration of certain future interests should also be consid-
ered. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45-97 (1977) (conditional fee becoming absolute if contin-
gency not occurring within thirty years). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 30 para. 37e 
(Smith-Hurd 1969) (possibility of reverter valid only for forty years). 
101. 245 Miss. 33, 145 So. 2d 455 (1962). 
102. See id. at 44-51, 145 So. 2d at 460-64 (denial of compensation for future inter-
ests not equitable and not consistent with related legal principles). The court rejected 
authorities, including the Restatement, which viewed future interests as not being vested 
rights and therefore non-compensable. Id. at 50-51, 145 So. 2d at 463. 
103. Id. at 52, 145 So. 2d at 464. 
104. Id. 
105. 390 So. 2d 588 (Miss. 1980). 
106. Id. at 592. 
107. Id. (quoting Hemphill). 
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While the Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized the 
unfairness of the Restatement's test, the court still focuses on 
value rather than directly on the fairness and indemnity dictate 
of the fifth amendment. As noted earlier, since a secondary mar-
ket for possibilities of reverter is unlikely, there is in fact no fair 
market value. The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, has es-
caped the strangle hold of the fair-market-value standard or the 
Restatement's test by recognizing that value could be based on 
other evidence. The court approved the result in Greenwood be-
cause giving the "entirety of the $150,000 eminent domain pro-
ceeds" to the owner of the defeasible fee "would be unconsciona-
ble and contrary to all rules of fairness. mos Therefore, although 
the fairness and indemnity requirement of the fifth amendment 
is not overtly presented to the jury, the court has refused to al-
low it to be subsumed by predetermined rules on value. 
C. Application of the Difference-In- Value Test 
In a recent Texas Supreme Court case, Leeco Gas & Oil Co. 
v. County of Nueces/09 the court made a valiant effort to avoid 
treating the Restatement test as the talisman for compensating 
the owner of a possibility of reverter. Its efforts fell short in the 
end, however, because the court simply latched onto the Ink dif-
ference-in-value test despite the significant factual differences 
between the two cases. 
In Leeco, Leeco deeded property to the county as a gift "so 
long as" the county maintained it as a public park.110 This grant 
created a fee simple determinable in the county and a possibility 
of reverter in Leeco. Subsequently, the county commenced con-
demnation proceedings to take Leeco's interest for a public use. 
In affirming a commissioner's award of ten dollars for Leeco's 
interest, the Texas Court of Appeals relied solely on the Re-
statement test as representing the "logically sound" majority 
rule.111 The appellate court made no mention of the constitu-
tional requirement of just compensation. Instead, it relied on 
testimony that the possibility of reverter had no market value. 112 
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with the lower 
108. ld. 
109. 736 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1987). 
110. ld. at 630 (deed to county so long as park constructed and maintained). 
111. Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. County of Nueces, 716 S.W.2d 615, 619 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1986) (value of reversionary interest too speculative), rev'd, 736 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1987). 
112. See id. (no evidence of imminent reversion). 
814 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1989 
court's determination that the county was not estopped from 
condemning due to the gift deed.113 In reversing the valuation 
question, however, the supreme court noted that even if the Re-
statement test were to control, reversion could be considered 
"imminent" since the evidence showed that the condemnation 
was "an attempt by the county to remove the 'burden' of the 
reversionary interest by condemning the interest and paying 
nominal damages."114 Another concern which influenced the 
court was the possible adverse impact on gifts of real property to 
governmental bodies.115 The court also found that ten dollars 
was not adequate and held that the difference-in-value test es-
tablished in Ink v. City of Canton would provide the measure of 
compensation required to be paid by a governmental entity that 
condemns the possibility of reverter created in a gift deed to 
that entity. 116 
The Leeco opinion represents only a partial victory for the 
fairness and indemnity dictate of the fifth amendment over the 
fair-market-value standard or the Restatement's imminency test 
since the court ultimately falls prey to the lure of the neatly 
packaged difference-in-value rule. This rule was formulated in 
cases involving the condemnation of the entire fee simple deter-
minable as well as the possibility of reverter. In those cases, a 
condemnation award was formulated on the basis of the un-
restricted fee, and the remaining question was how to allocate 
the award between the owner of the determinable fee and the 
owner of the possibility of reverter.117 Those cases did not in-
volve the condemnation of a possibility of reverter at the behest 
of the governmental body which was given the determinable fee 
in the same tract of land. 118 The Texas court recognized these 
differences but still ruled that the Ink test applied. 
113. Leeco, 736 S.W.2d at 630 (exercise of governmental power not subject to 
estoppel). 
114. Id. at 631 (county official testifying to future plans which were inconsistent 
with deed restrictions). 
115. Id. 
116. See id. at 631-32 (excess value of unrestricted fee over restricted fee constitut-
ing proper compensation). 
117. See Ink v. City of Canton, 4 Ohio St. 2d 51, 58-59, 212 N.E.2d 574, 579 (1965) 
(compensation for unrestricted property value subject to division among interest hold-
ers). See also State v. Independent School Dist., 266 Minn. 85, 93, 123 N. W.2d 121, 127 
(1963) (proper distribution of condemnation award left to court determination). 
118. For cases involving the converse situation, see Rogers v. State Roads Comm'n, 
227 Md. 560, 567-68, 177 A.2d 850, 854 (1962) (condemnor owned benefits under restric-
tive covenant which reduced value of condemned property for compensation purposes) 
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The Leeco court also recognized that reversion could be 
considered imminent, which was not true in Ink. If the land had 
reverted, Leeco would have owned it in fee and the fair-market-
value standard would require paying the unrestricted value.119 
Instead, the county was allowed to obtain an unrestricted fee 
simple interest by paying only the difference in value between 
the restricted and unrestricted fee, while Leeco lost its reverter 
rights and possibly any consideration which motivated it to 
make the initial gift.120 According to the United States Supreme 
Court, this results is an unfair windfall to the government. 
D. Demoralization Costs and Fiscal Illusion: Considerations 
in Determining Just Compensation 
The donee/condemnor facts of Leeco also inflicted demorali-
zation costs which were absent in the Ink case. The Texas Su-
preme Court apparently recognized the role of demoralization 
costs as a factor in determining just compensation in its concern 
for the negative impact upon gifts of property to governmental 
entities.121 In the donee/ condemnor situation, the question be-
comes whether paying the restricted value to the owner of the 
possibility of reverter, rather than the unrestricted fair market 
value, would quiet the grantor/possibility of reverter owner's 
unease about being strategically exploited by the government's 
decision to condemn the grantor's interest after accepting a gift 
from the grantor.122 Requiring the condemnor to pay the un-
and State v. Callahan, 242 Or. 551, 410 P.2d 818, 820 (1966) (compensation limited to 
restricted value even where state owned possibility of reverter). 
119. See Leeco, 736 S.W.2d at 631 (where condemnor has no present interest in the 
property actual damages must be paid as compensation). 
120. See id. at 632 (Campbell, J., concurring) (condemnation inconsistent with gran-
tor's intended purpose). It is not clear what consideration Leeco received when it made 
the gift. Consideration in these cases could range from tax benefits, to benefits conferred 
on adjoining land, or frequently the strokes given to the grantor's ego when he gives land 
to be used as a park bearing his name. Cf. Ink, 4 Ohio St. 2d at 57-58, 212 N.E.2d at 578 
(no consideration paid by grantee other than duty to maintain park bearing grantor's 
name); Romero v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 17 Cal. 2d 189, 196, 109 P.2d 662, 666 (1941) 
(consideration was retention of benefits). The Romero court stated: "[W]hen the state 
deprived the plaintiffs of their reversionary interest in said 60-foot strip, it took from 
them not merely a naked reversionary title, but what may be considered a substantial 
benefit retained by the grantor of said strip, which benefit was the consideration for the 
grant ... . "/d. 
121. See Leeco, 736 S.W.2d at 631 (nominal damages not in best interests of state's 
citizens). See also Michelman, supra note 6, at 1213-14 (discussing the impact of demor-
alization costs). 
122. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1217. 
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restricted fair market value insures that the government will not 
take advantage of the ownership position created in it by the 
gift.123 
Another factual difference between Leeco and Ink which 
would require a different rule of compensation is the heightened 
opportunity for the fiscal illusion phenomenon in the donee/con-
demnor situation. In Leeco, the county commissioners were 
aware that condemnation is based on fair market value and that 
under this standard the possibility of reverter owned by Leeco 
would be virtually worthless. The weak testimony by public offi-
cials about future plans for the land fairly raised the question 
whether the county was actually motivated by the extremely low 
cost or the need to obtain the property on the behalf of the pub-
lic.124 The court summarized the situation as one in which the 
county attempted to obtain something for nothing.125 If the 
county had not received the restricted fee as a gift and the land 
123. See Leeco, 736 S.W.2d at 631 (county undermining restrictions by condemna-
tion without proper compensation). The donee/condemnor situation is reminiscent of 
cases in which a city attempted to restrict value by rezoning before condemning. See, 
e.g., Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 
619, 620 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (designation of land as ponding area merely guise to avoid 
proper taking); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy 
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 551-53, 193 A.2d 232, 239-40 (1963) (restriction of land to uses for 
which it is unsuitable merely froze land for future flood control without taking); Miller v. 
City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 194, 82 A.2d 34, 37 (1951) (designation as possible park 
amounted to taking by contingency). In one case, a city attempted to remove restrictions 
on its use of the grant by conveying the property to a separate city agency. The court 
recognized this action as an attempt by the city to gain unrestricted use of the property 
without eminent domain procedures or just compensation. City of Laurel v. Powers, 366 
So. 2d 1079, 1083 (Miss. 1979). See generally Sax, supra note 5, at 46 (discussing com-
mon attempts to reduce takings costs). As Justice Powell noted in his concurrence in 
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse. Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) 
(Powell, J., concurring), the government will not be permitted to affect value through the 
use of "salami tactics." Similarly, the Supreme Court of Georgia noted that "condemning 
authorities may not cynically play 'Parcheesi' with condemnation procedures to accom-
plish ends that they might not accomplish without manipulation of those procedures." 
Department of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 142, 337 S.E.2d 327, 341 (1985). 
124. See Leeco, 736 S.W.2d at 631 (testimony given that fee restrictions limited 
needed park development including income producing activities). At the condemnation 
hearing itself, two Nueces County officials testified that the county planned to "develop 
a marine-world type of park which would generate income for the county and grant 
drainage easements to Padre Island Development Company, provide service stations, 
carnivals and car washes .... "Application for Writ of Error at 7, Leeco Gas & Oil Co. 
v. County of Nueces, 736 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1987) (No. C-5950). While not necessarily 
inconsistent with the use of the land as a park, the proposed activities would clearly 
violate the conditions of the deed. See Leeco, 736 S.W.2d at 631. 
125. See id. (describing nominal compensation as inadequate and an attempt by the 
county to unburden itself). 
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was needed for a public use, the county would have had to figure 
the fair market value of the unrestricted fee into its cost/benefit 
analysis in making the condemnation decision. Only if that value 
is used in the donee/condemnor situation will just compensation 
provide the needed safeguard against unnecessary use of the em-
inent domain power. 
The Leeco case provides a microcosm for viewing the role 
that demoralization costs and the fiscal illusion phenomenon 
should play in determining just compensation as well as the role 
that overzealous attachment to predetermined rules or stan-
dards currently plays. The case also illustrates the increased role 
of just compensation in all takings cases due to the newly-
neutered status of the public use requirement. As the Texas Su-
preme Court noted, the county commissioners did not have a 
hardened notion about the use of the taken property, and it sim-
ply appeared the county wanted to remove the restriction by 
paying nominal damages. Yet under state statutes and general 
public use doctrine, the Texas courts had no problem in decid-
ing that this taking was for a public use.126 Just compensation, 
then, was left as the only protection against eminent domain 
abuse by the governmental entity. 
Although the court did not overtly rely on the fifth amend-
ment's fairness and indemnity dictate, it was obviously guided 
by the unique equities of the donee/condemnor situation. As-
suming that the just compensation question had to be answered 
with a predetermined standard, as the court ultimately decided, 
requiring payment of the unrestricted fair market value would 
be the best response when the government condemns the possi-
bility of reverter in land it received as a gift. In general, how-
ever, if just compensation is going to fulfill its role as the final 
protection against governmental abuses of private property, the 
equities suggested by the facts of the particular case, and not 
predetermined rules, should determine just compensation. 
IV. THE GoLDBERG-UNUMB ARTICLE ANn THE CoNDEMNATION 
CLAUSE 
Putting aside for the moment the question about how just 
compensation should be decided, the fact is that currently it is 
decided with the fair-market-value test in general, and with the 
126. See Leeco, 716 S.W.2d at 618 (better utilization of park facilities sufficient pub-
lic purpose for taking). 
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Restatement test or the difference-in-value test in the case of 
possibilities of reverter. A property owner may be able to avoid 
the application of these "default rules" with an ex ante condem-
nation clause.127 In a recent article, Professors Goldberg and 
Merrill, and Daniel Unumb discuss the use of this clause in an-
other form of divided ownership, landlord and tenant.128 The au-
thors do not take issue with the fair-market-value standard but 
suggest that in dividing that award, the sum of the parts should 
always equal the value of an undivided fee simple and urge the 
use of condemnation clauses in determining the apportion-
ment.129 In considering their suggestions in the context of future 
interests, they focus on Ink v. City of Canton and conclude that 
the approach used in that case is an "invitation to disaster."130 
In reaching their conclusion, the authors commit the now famil-
iar sin of equating just compensation with fair market value 
rather than with the fairness and indemnity dictate of the fifth 
amendment. 
In Ink, the court was faced with the question of how to di-
vide an award, which was based upon the value of the undivided 
fee, between the owners of the determinable fee and the possi-
bility of reverter.131 The court determined that fairness and not 
value should dictate the result. Goldberg, Merrill, and Unumb 
state the truism that neither interest has a market and therefore 
the ex post fair market value of the parts would not add up to 
the market value of the unrestricted fee simple.132 They decide 
that due to this inability to value the interest, as well as admin-
istrative and tax reasons, the entire award should go to the 
owner of the determinable fee. 133 Instead of considering whether 
127. See Goldberg, Merrill & Unumb, Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Do-
main: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Ten-
ant, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1083, 1087 (1987) (division of condemnation award predetermined 
by agreement in instrument). 
128. Id. 
129. /d. at 1132 (favoring condemnation agreements to apportion value of undivided 
fee). 
130. ld. at 1133. 
131. See Ink v. City of Canton, 4 Ohio St. 2d 51, 58, 212 N.E.2d 574, 579 (1965) 
(portion of the award representing difference between unrestricted and restricted uses 
payable to grantor). 
132. See Goldberg, Merrill & Unumb, supra note 127, at 1133-34 (attempts at valu-
ation erroneous). The authors erroneously read the Ink opinion as purely an attempt to 
value the present and future estates rather than as a fairness approach to the just com-
pensation question. 
133. Id. at 1135 (difficulties of division justify total award to grantee). 
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this result is fair, they criticize the Ink court's consideration of 
fairness as providing no answer to the valuation question.134 
Their myopic approach is disastrous because it ignores the 
United States Supreme Court's specific directive that when mar-
ket value is too difficult to ascertain, some other method of valu-
ation must be used as well as the general notions of fairness and 
indemnity inherent in the just compensation requirement. This 
approach renders the just compensation question responsive to 
procedural and valuation concerns rather than the Constitution. 
The authors do recognize that the ideal solution to the 
problem of apportionment would be to use a condemnation 
clause in the granting instrument.135 It would likely be the gran-
tor's prerogative to do so since determinable fees are usually cre-
ated by gift rather than contract. Unfortunately, however, they 
mistakenly conclude that the Rule against Perpetuities would 
bar the use of such a clause when the grantor creates a determi-
nable fee in the grantee. 136 When such an estate is created in the 
grantee, the grantor retains a possibility of reverter.137 The au-
thors erroneously characterize the interest of the heirs as a pos-
sibility of reverter. The possibility of reverter creates no interest 
in the heirs of the grantor although they stand to inherit it from 
him. 138 The Rule against Perpetuities does not affect a possibil-
134. See id. at 1134 n.119 (advocating focus on fair market value over fairness 
standard). 
135. ld. at 1134. 
136. ld. at 1134-35. The authors are correct in stating that clauses are "rarely" en-
countered in this area. Id. at 1134. 
137. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 53, at 58 (possible termination of 
grantee's estate leaves possibility of reverter in grantor). Bergin and Haskell state: "A 
possibility of reverter is the future interest a transferrer keeps when he transfers an 
estate whose maximum potential duration equals that of the state he had to start with 
and attaches a special limitation that operates in his own favor." Id. (footnote omitted). 
See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 154 (1936) (defining possibility of reverter); 
L. SIMES, supra note 53, at 28-29 (possibility of reverter arising in grantor from grant of 
determinable fee). 
138. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 53, at 59 (possibility of reverter inher-
itable by devise or descent). The authors conclude: 
Possibilities of reverter are transferable inter vivos. If the owner of a devisable 
and inheritable estate grants that estate on special limitation, the possibility of 
reverter that the grantor keeps may pass by will to his devisees or by the laws 
of intestacy to his heirs. Like the reversion, the possibility of reverter is an 
interest that is retained by the transferor at the time it is created. A possibility 
of reverter that is transferred after its creation generally continues to be called 
a possibility of reverter no matter how or to whom it passes. 
ld. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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ity of reverter.139 Therefore, if the grantor inserted a clause that 
clearly made condemnation an event causing reverter, the Rule 
would not invalidate this right.140 If the grantor dies, the possi-
bility of reverter passes to the heirs but is still immune to the 
Rule against Perpetuities in their hands.141 Since the Rule 
against Perpetuities does apply to executory interests, a clause 
which attempted to give the award to someone other than the 
grantor would be subject to the Rule.142 A grantor contemplating 
a restricted gift should clearly state that condemnation will re-
sult in a reversion to avoid the likely application of default rules 
which favor the grantee. 
V. CoNcLusioN 
Holmes' admonition that courts refrain from blindly imitat-
ing the past was designed to encourage the abolition of rules of 
law when history revealed their obsolescence. The corollary he 
offered was that when the ends have been defined and remain 
relevant, the rules should clearly and articulately refer to that 
end.143 While the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the 
139. See id., supra note 53, at 179 (certain future interests not subject to Rule). 
"For reasons which are more historical than rational, [the Rule against Perpetuities] was 
not made applicable to the possibility of reverter or the right of entry." Id. (footnote 
omitted). The authors correctly note in a footnote that the Rule does apply to executory 
interests but not to possibilities of reverter. Goldberg, Merrill & Unumb, supra note 126, 
at 1135 n.20. See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 4 intra. (1936) (Rule applying 
to executory interests but not possibility of reverter); L. SIMES, supra note 53, at 279-80 
(possibility of reverter not subject to Rule). However, the authors confuse the ownership 
of that estate as being in the heirs rather than the grantor. Goldberg, Merrill & Unumb, 
supra note 127, at 1134-35 & n.20. 
140. The authors note that due to courts' penchant for rules of construction to avoid 
forfeiture, clauses should clearly state the effect of condemnation. Goldberg, Merrill & 
Unumb, supra note 127, at 1121 (clauses in condemnation of leasehold). Courts have 
reached different conclusions when the granting instrument simply provided that a sale 
would cause a reverter. Compare United States v. 726.23 Acres of Land, 746 F.2d 1363, 
1365 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejected argument that condemnation affected a sale) with Pedrotti 
v. Marin County, 152 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1946) (equated condemnation with a sale 
thus causing reverter). See also United States v. 808.40 Acres of Land, 372 F. Supp. 
1165, 1166 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (did not find clear intent that condemnation caused reverter). 
141. See sources cited supra note 139. 
142. See discussion of Rule against Perpetuities as applicable to executory interests 
supra note 137. Executory interests are created in someone other than the grantor. See 
C. MoYNIHAN, supra note 54, at 197 (executory interest never created in transferrer); L. 
SIMES, supra note 53, at 25 (executory interest always in grantee). 
143. Holmes, supra note 1, at 469. "Still it is true that a body of law is more rational 
and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an 
end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are 
ready to be stated in words." Id. 142. 
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historically enduring end of just compensation as one of fairness 
and indemnity, it has also permitted blatant deviations from 
that end through strict adherence to its fair-market-value stan-
dard. The future interest cases illustrate the need to ensure that 
just compensation is directly responsive to the fifth amendment 
by directly addressing its dictate rather than detouring through 
objective standards which stress valuation rather than fairness. 
This approach would permit the consideration of many signifi-
cant factors which are currently ignored, such as demoralization 
costs and fiscal illusion, thus enabling the just compensation 
mandate to compensate for the neutered status of the public use 
requirement. The inherently amorphous nature of this approach 
can be adequately structured with proper jury instructions as 
well as the continued use of specialized statutes.144 The usual 
objections to any fairness approach, however, lose cogency when 
the just compensation requirement is viewed, as it currently 
must be, as the final protection against governmental abuses of 
private property. 
144. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622 to 4624 (1982) (moving expenses and supplemental 
payments for displaced owners and tenants); TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 13-11-105 to 107 
(1987) (compensating relocation expenses); VA CoDE ANN. §§ 25-239 to 25-241 (1985) 
(prescribing separate awards for relocation and home acquisition costs) or for special 
incidental losses, compare CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDE §§ 1263.510 (Deering 1981) (require-
ments for compensating loss of business goodwill) with FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.071 (West 
1987) (permitting compensation in partial takings for incidental losses to businesses over 
five years old). 
